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Introduction 
Since the early 90s, criminologists have begun to question the nature of everyday forensic science 
practices [1-10], and this obviously has consequences for its related ethics and deontology [11-14]. 
It appears that the 1993 US Daubert hearing not only challenged the nature of the various fields of 
forensic science [15-17] but also our understanding of the nature of evidence. This had already been 
confronted by the development of DNA analysis [18]. Moreover it also challenged the concept of 
forensic science as being a unified whole, by invoking Popper's falsificationist epistemology as 
being the only relevant criteria for accepting a body of knowledge as science. [19] As the ‘crime 
scene’ is the basis of the subsequent interpretation of evidence, Inman and Rudin affirm that 
Locard’s Principle was unable to be tested, and as such was metaphysical, and hence not ‘scientific’ 
in the US Supreme Court terms influenced by Popper. This almost removed all scientific character 
from later professional practice. 
On the other hand, both the scientific methodology defended, for instance, by criminologists such as 
Tuthill, Bevel or Wertheim, [21-23] and the reasoning process, seem powerless [24, 25], if not 
irrelevant [26, 27] in allowing us to defend the higher philosophical level of forensic science, 
without taking into account the process of the management of the crime scene. Moreover, although 
recognising the importance of crime scene examination within forensic science, a recent paper 
downplayed the importance of qualifying it as scientific, even claiming that its reliance on inductive 
rather than deductive reasoning meant it could not be said to be ‘truly scientific’ [28]. 
This new interest in the true nature of our full body of knowledge requires not only a better 
understanding of the logic of science, but also shows the need to break down the constraints 
provided by believing that inductivism and deductivism are the only available scientific approaches. 
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 I – The present state of epistemology: is Popper the only available philosophical criteria to 
define sciences? 
The Daubert hearing required courts to focus only on the fundamental principles of applied science 
and on its related methodology to allow it to understand the scientific nature of expert knowledge 
[20, 29]. It almost calls to mind the three ‘levels’ which constitute science, with the Principles or 
Fundamental Ideas at the top, Applied Methodology underneath and the Technical Tools at the 
bottom [15, 30, 31]. The Daubert case asks us to question our understanding of the upper level of 
science, remembering that repetitive and comparative methods do not guarantee the scientific nature 
of knowledge, as can be seen in astrology, witchcraft or Adlerian psychology. As an aside, do not 
theological universities, generally considered as belonging to the world of metaphysics, sometimes 
declare themselves to be engaged in scientific research, embracing even forensic science [32] ? 
 
It may be better to remind ourselves of the evolutionary nature of the philosophical concepts of 
science, leading to rational criticism as being the baseline of today’s western scientific culture. The 
pathway from an antiquarian anthropocentrist perception of the world – at that time perceived as 
scientific – to a positivist understanding of our environment – which is why it is called ‘natural 
science’ – leaves traces about our understanding of the external world, which itself has 
consequences for our thinking processes and our contemporary empirical methodology. 
 
As Aristotelicism insists that deductivism is the only possible scientific process, relying on accepted 
premises issued from an inductive intuition, its scholastic application, which refused to question the 
Biblical truths of the Revelation, allowed western science to flounder until the 15th century. At this 
time, the only academic study at the time was in relation to God, and the natural world could only 
be considered in that context. This was not challenged until the discoveries and research of 
Copernicus (1473 – 1543) and Galileo (1564 – 1642), and this created 200 years of academic 
turbulence. Descartes (1596 - 1650) was the first philosopher not to challenge deductivism, but to 
seek fundamental principles not arising from religious certainties but from a personal questioning of 
oneself. This would lead to a logical pathway which itself would lead back to God. This logical 
construction of the world, finding support in practical observation, does not protect us from 
conceptual fallacies such as the Vortex Theory, where the sun would be at the centre of a large 
whirlwind where planets and satellites swirl around a centre. 
 
At the same time, Sir Francis Bacon (1561 – 1626) proposed that no underlying theory was needed 
to observe and interpret nature, with knowledge being merely the result of experience [33]. Even if 
this completely inductivist approach at the macro level contributed to the advance of the British 
Industrial Revolution with its mechanical advances, its application at the daily new discovered 
telescopic and microscopic levels let David Hume (1711 – 1776) demonstrate that induction is 
unable to be the basis of  a general law [34].  
 
Within rationalism, which tries to construct an underlying structure on which to build scientific 
knowledge [35-37], it has to be admitted that the Fundamental Principles are only hypotheses [38, 
39], for which invariant relations between observations allow us to predict phenomenological 
occurrences supporting an imaginary, but accepted law, thus defining the positivist approach of 
Auguste Comte (1798 – 1897). The incredible success of this philosophy seems to be supported by 
the then 200 year old physicist theory of Newton. It is not surprising that a logical normalisation of 
this philosophy was developed by a collection of philosophers and scientists within the so-called 
logical positivist Vienna school, which would have led to a Universal Theory of Knowledge during 
the first half of the 20th century. This was at a time when Newton's theory was finally proved 
incorrect by the successful prediction by Einstein of the curvature of rays of the sun during the 1919 
eclipse. 
This event allowed Karl Raymund Popper (1902 – 1994) to develop his own falsificationist 
epistemology of knowledge, where our certainties can only be negative: we can only be sure of a 
theory which does not work, never of a one which does work, which can only be labelled as ‘not yet 
falsified’. Hence, science is the body of knowledge relying on principles which are able to be tested 
for falsification, i.e. on which we can create experiments to try to prove them wrong [40-42]. 
 
Anachronisms in Popper's explanation of the historical progress of science, and difficulties in 
distinguishing the absence of controls from tests for falsification led even Popper to soften his 
falsificationist philosophy, and opened the door to his contradictors as early as the 1960s [26, 43-
46]. This is not the place to explain their epistemological proposals, but it is better to record that the 
Daubert hearing focused on an epistemology which was highly criticised in the 90s, and was 
qualified by Popper himself as irrelevant for a full set of knowledge, tackling or including 
sociological data as forensics obviously does, if crime is considered as a sociological fact [47]. 
 
Today, a syncretic Popper-Kuhn neo-experimentalist epistemology requires a better understanding 
of control factors in experiments through an iterative optimisation process, before testing their 
fundamental principles for falsification [48-54]. Applied to forensic science, this approach requires 
a better understanding of the SOCO's1 working conditions including their reasoning processes to 
increase the chance of finding traces, i.e. optimisation of Locard's Principle, before testing it for 
falsification. 
 
II – Deduction, induction and abduction as the true nature of human reasoning. 
The complexity of human reasoning, permanently shifting between different kinds of induction and 
deduction, sometimes does not allow for an oversimplification of human thinking between an 
alternative deduction/induction duality [55]. Moreover, this limitation of the thinking process does 
not allow us to recognise that even induction was not really defined before the 19th century, as it 
                                                 
1  The ‘Scenes of Crime Officer’. 
indiscriminately covered a direct logical empirical generalisation of fact by reason or by systematic 
experimentation. Newton himself defined it as a phenomenological deduction, meaning a logical 
consequence of scientific conclusions from repetitive occurrences [56]. Thus, when induction is 
used by Descartes, Kant, Newton or Sherlock Holmes, can we be sure they mean the same thing? 
 
If we make an effort better to distinguish between these thinking processes we are able to propose 
that deduction can produce the results of a pure hypothesis in which truth is not questioned, as 
induction only tests an hypothesis, which would be accepted by the (single or repeated) 
observations of facts, considered at the time to be true. Hence, figure 1 explains that induction is the 
only thought process able to issue a general law through scrutiny of the initial situation and 
subsequent observations, as deduction derives observations from these initial conditions under a 
general law, which cannot be questioned. This thinking process induces a third undetected process 
called abduction [37] : abduction is an unsound basis from which to develop explanatory initial 
conditions to match accepted theory with observations [57, 58]. It infers the initial conditions 
derived from an accepted general law and ‘a posteriori’ observations. To summarise: deduction 
proves that something should happen, induction shows something is happening, and abduction 
suggests that something could be happening. 
 Figure 1 : Inferences schematisation 
 
It should be understood that abduction, like deduction and induction, is only an inference, as simple, 
as solid and as natural as the other two. It is the thousand year old reasoning process of the hunter 
acquiring the art of detecting animals through trace observation [59], analogous of the tasks of the 
investigator and criminologist [60]. It is as formal and mechanical as the other inferences, with a 
conclusion as logically strong. It is neither a more original nor a more inventive process than the 
processes of deduction or induction, and it would be difficult to claim that one of them is 
psychologically easier or more difficult than the others [61]. The scientifically accepted 
hypothetico-deductive method [62, 63], when applied to crime scene investigation looks, in the 
absence of question about Locard's Principle, like a set of deduction and abduction shuttle 
processes. 
 
Finally, how can it be claimed that deductive inference is more scientific, as progress in science 
would have been impossible without some risk being taken during the development of a new 
theoretical hypothesis through induction supported by abduction leading to the establishment of a 
general law? This would be simply impossible through pure deduction alone. 
 
Conclusion 
It is understandable that the epistemological approach still represents a challenge for our forensic 
community, as a major and unchallengeable characteristic of criminalitics, not shared with other 
sciences, is its interest in individualisation. Whilst other sciences incline towards taxonomical 
classification, our science wants to link any unidentified evidence or item to a unique source [64]. 
This is also what the bringing-together of so many disparate forensic fields: biological, ballistic, 
chemical, human traces, nuclear, radiological, engineering, etc... relies on. 
 
If we are ready to leave our ‘pre-scientific’ status to enter into a ‘scientific’ one, we shouldn't be 
afraid to question our fundamental principles through a recognised philosophical strategy, which 
would not only fully define our daily practice as scientists, but also recognise crime scene 
management as belonging to this forensic group, because it is the fundamental building block of 
this undoubtedly natural science. 
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